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"Bemühen wir uns darum auch, jedwede Forderung an den Staat  
nicht vorschnell mit dem Wort 'sozial' oder 'gerecht' zu versehen,  
wenn es in Wahrheit nur zu oft um partikuläre Wünsche geht."  
(Ludwig Erhard (Regierungserklärung, 18.10.1963)) 
‘In a democratic society there are two bounds that should never be crossed:  
one beyond which the unlegitimated power of individuals arises,  
the other beyond which legitimate public power becomes illegitimate.’ 
(Guiliano Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power, (Hart: Oxford, 1997) at 3) 
Abstract 
This Paper argues that the demarcations of public power arrived at in EC com-
petition law by the Court and the Commission, while sensitive to State pre-
rogatives, reveal a picture of State incapacity rather than capacity; freezing the 
state out of the market rather than deliberating any, however attractive, subtle 
balance of constitutionalised private governance. We progress from a review 
of the place of competition within the Treaty and a broader consideration of 
the policy framework (Section I). Attention then turns to what are identified as 
the three degrees of State Incapacity: (1) the State’s regulatory role (Section 
II); (2) the state and the exercise of the public authority function (Section III); 
(3) elaborating the public interest in the provision of services of general eco-
nomic interest (Section IV). 
I. State Incapacity in EC Competition Law 
This Paper argues that the demarcations of public power arrived at in EC 
Competition law, while sensitive to State prerogatives, reveal a picture of State 
incapacity rather than capacity. We progress from a review of the place of 
competition within the Treaty as it addresses State/Market relations to a 
broader consideration of policy (Section I). Attention then turns to the three 
degrees of State Incapacity: addressing (1) the State as regulator (Section II); 
(2) the State and the exercise of the public authority function (Section III); (3) 
elaborating the public interest in ensuring the service of general economic in-
terest (Section IV). 
 A. EC Economic law addressing the State 
Since the mid-1980s EC competition law has been directed at public and not 
simply private undertakings, at Member States in their regulatory roles as well 
as private actors in their exercise of public functions. The economic neutrality 
of the EC Treaty and the idea of state intervention in the economy - indeed 
faith in the ability of public institutions to organise themselves without capitu-
lating to particular interests - have become discredited in most of Europe and 
in the Commission.1 The policy underlying this tide of privatisation and liber-
alisation has been to ensure efficiency in the provision of public services.2 To 
some market liberalisation has been the logical, even unavoidable consequence 
of establishing the internal market.3 The ‘public’ application of the competition 
norms has been bolstered with the Treaty revisions adding Articles 4 and 16 
EC to the competition matrix. In this paper we deal with the classical provi-
sions of competition law as they apply to the regulatory State, the public and 
the public/private sector. The public application of competition is the corollary 
of applying free movement law to measures of public national law, the double 
interface being intended to produce efficiency and preclude protectionism. 
Community rules on state aid, public procurement and the adjustment of na-
tional monopolies are outside the scope of this paper.4 Four initial observations 
can be made on the competition provisions as they apply to the State:  
(1.)  Sui generis law: EC competition law has always been a complementary 
                                                 
1  Generally: A. Jones & B. Sufrin EC Competition Law (2nd Ed. OUP, 2004), L 
Hancher, Community, State and Market, in P. Craig & G. de Búrca (eds.) The Evo-
lution of EU law (OUP, 1999) 721. J.L. Buenida Sierra, Exclusive Rights and State 
Monopolies in EC Law, (OUP, 1999). More particularly: A. Gardner, The Velvet 
Revolution: Article 90 and the Triumph of the Free Market in Europe’s Regulated 
Sectors, (1995) ECLR 78 at 79. 
2  P. Rott, A New Social Contract Law for Public Services? – Consequences from 
Regulation of Services of General Economic Interest in the EC, (2005) 3 ERCL 323 
at 324; R. Rüge, Die Gewährleistungsverantwortung des Staates und der Regulatory 
State, (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2004).  
3  E. Szyszczak, Public Service Provision in Competitive Markets, (2001) 20 YEL 35 
at 36: ‘Governments and private companies alike have persuaded their electorates 
and consumers of the capacity of markets to provide not only private goods and ser-
vices, but also what have traditionally been viewed as publicly provided services….’ 
4  Overview: C. Bovis, Financing Services of General Interest in the EU: How do Pub-
lic Procurement and State Aids Interact to Demarcate between Market Forces and 
Protectionism? (2005) ELJ 79.  
 3
policy; the bridge to other objectives; above all, to market integration.5  
(2.)  Interrelated laws: the competition provisions preclude collusion and 
abuse of dominance, and the state measure facilitating such abuse or 
dominance.  
(3.)  Liberalisation: the law cuts into private practices and public preroga-
tives.  
(4.)  Variable quality: the specificity of Articles 81 and 82 EC vs. the declara-
tory quality of Article 86 EC. 
B. The Policy Framework of Traité cadre Competition 
The Treaty’s programmatic provisions, Articles 2 and 3, pursue contradictory 
goals: inter alia establishing a common market and ensuring that competition 
is not distorted (Article 3(g)). This requires that the market is predicated on 
efficiency, and confirms that competition law applies throughout the EU, an 
aspect underscored in Article 4. These principles reflect the importance of the 
Economic for European integration; free movement and competition were the 
catalysts of integration.6 Yet competition was not the only goal: Article 2 
charts goals of sustainable growth, competitiveness, convergence, social pro-
tection, the environment, economic and social cohesion. Article 3, meanwhile, 
mandates a commercial policy, employment, industrial, R&D, cultural and 
consumer policies. The competition provisions link into this framework in 
which States are precluded from taking ‘any measure which could jeopardise 
the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.’7 
The most complex balance in competition is that between State and Market, 
between public and private power.8 Yet public undertakings are not incompati-
ble with competition; Article 295 prescribes neutrality as to state ownership. 
This is reinforced by Article 86(1), requiring the application of the competition 
                                                 
5  Case 56 & 58/64, Consten & Grundig, [1966] ECR 299 at 340; D.G. Goyder, EC 
Competition Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 1993) at 22-5. 
6  Article 28 EC as Lebensnerv der EG: H-W. Micklitz, Das Keck-Urteil des EuGH – 
vom Binnenmarkt zurück zum Freihandel? [1994] IStR 86; ‘umbilical cord of the in-
ternal market’: D. Chalmers, Repackaging the Internal Market – The Ramifications 
of the Keck judgment [1994] 19 ELRev 385. See also: Guidelines on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, (2004) OJ C101/98 at para. 13. 
7  Article 10 EC; Policy competition in competition policy: G. Monti, Article 81 and 
Public Policy, (2002) 39 CMLRev 1057; R. Bouterse, Competition and Integration: 
What Goals Count? (Deventer, Kluwer, 1994). 
8  G. Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power, (Oxford, Hart, 1997) at 3. 
 rules to State undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive 
Rights have been granted. This is subject to the derogation allowing services of 
general economic interest (SGEI) to operate on a basis ensuring that they are 
able to fulfil their missions. Here tension arises between competition and sov-
ereignty; of ensuring that citizens have access to certain basic services. The 
Commission has intervened in this balance with the 2004 White Paper on 
SGEI.9  
The Treaty provisions may be read in different ways: while by concentrat-
ing on Articles 81, 82 and 3(g) EC a market-orientation emerges, state preroga-
tives are stressed in a reading focusing on Articles 295, 10 and 16 EC. The 
main problem is that of demarcation: just as every contract is a restraint of 
trade in that it is exclusive, almost all state measures could distort competition. 
We face political choices: does free childcare, tertiary education or a state mo-
nopoly in air-traffic control not upset the level playing field? The answers to 
such questions are as revealing in the light they shed on EC principles as they 
are of institutional preferences and European pragmatism. As Advocate Gen-
eral Jacobs observed: ‘It might be asked why… Article 86(1) EC does not 
cover all labour and other social measures which... might distort competition... 
The answer is… essentially a pragmatic one: to investigate all such regimes 
would entail an inquiry on the basis of the Treaty alone into the entire social 
and economic life of a Member State.’10 
The implications of such pragmatism are clear: initially market integration 
took precedence over the generic benefits of competition; market integration 
perceived of as the non-economic goal of EC competition.11 However, Treaty 
revisions successively placed emphasis on other policy goals. Predictably, a 
regime erosive of national law and with a qualified commitment to ‘perfect’ 
competition emerged. Further, to effect positive integration, harmonisation 
measures, under Articles 86(3) or 95 EC became necessary. Yet while the 
Commission could elaborate the obligations arising out of the Treaty, where 
the Community has not ‘occupied the field’ it may not invade national defini-
tions. Thus, whilst functionalism has accompanied competition, it has other-
wise been constrained where EC measures were passed: i.e. where the market 
was liberalised, the emerging commercial undertakings could no longer be 
                                                 
9  2004 White Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(2004) 374 final.  
10  Joined Cases C-52, 53, 54/97, Viscido v Poste Italiane, [1998] ECR I-2629, AG Ja-
cobs para. 16, at 2635. 
11  B.E. Hawk, System failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law, [1995] 32 
CMLRev 973; D.J. Gerber, Transformation of EC Competition Law, [1995] Harvard 
Intl LJ 97 at 102; J.D. Veltrop, Tying and Exclusive Purchasing Agreements under 
EC Competition Law [1994] 31 CMLRev 549 at 552. 
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touched by secondary law. The broad construction of state measures or private 
practices in Free Movement and Competition ‘directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially’ affecting trade meant that this was easily triggered. Moreover, in 
competition the room for functionalism was especially wide as the Commis-
sion was in charge of determining the relevant market.12 
While functionalism fuelled negative integration, the Court’s rulings on ex-
emptions stressed positive integration. For example, where an agreement fell 
outside Article 81(1) EC, a positive element of competition is disclosed. Rather 
than being engaged in commercial activities, the undertaking could be found to 
be providing SGEI and either outside the ambit of competition, or within Article 
86(2) EC, and subject to control rather than prohibition under Article 86(1) EC. 
Here we begin to see the implications of the reciprocity of traité cadre competi-
tion: the parallel exemptions to the free movement provisions leaving a state 
monopoly, limited to domestic products, unaffected by Article 28 EC by virtue 
of Article 31(1) EC. Just how cross-referential the exceptions in Articles 31, 
86(1) and 86(2) EC are, can be seen in the 1997 Electricity Cases:13 whilst the 
undertakings could not rely on Article 31 EC, they could engage Article 86(2) 
EC. However, Treaty derogations are only available insofar as they are neces-
sary to allow undertakings to perform genuine public service tasks; tasks which, 
as with Article 30 EC, are non-economic, concerned with public health and se-
curity, or are linked to universal service provision. Discriminatory measures or 
measures going beyond what is necessary to achieve public goals are precluded. 
Thus, whilst it may be attractive to perceive free movement as addressed to 
States and competition to private parties this is untenable. Three features of the 
traité cadre confirm the norms’ reciprocity: (1) the application of free movement 
to private parties; (2) the extension of competition law to the state measure; and 
(3) the elaboration of Article 86.14  
(1.) The application of free movement to private parties:  
As far as the first point is concerned, in Leclerc we see that free movement and 
competition are linked, the Court having previously held that public free 
                                                 
12  Respectively: Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837, para. 5; 
Consten, cited above note 5 at 341. Exemplified: Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister v 
Commission, [1979] ECR 1869; T-30/89, Hilti v Commission [1990] ECR II-163. 
13  Electricity cases: Case 157/94, Netherlands, [1997] ECR I-5699; Case C-159/94, 
France, [1997] ECR I-5815; Case C-158/94, Italy, [1997] ECR I-5789 paras. 33-44; 
Case C-160/94, Spain, [1997] ECR I-5851. 
14  K. Mortelmans, Towards Convergence in the application of the Rules on Free 
Movement and on Competition? (2001) CMLRev 613. 
 movement provisions could address private parties.15 By extension, private 
parties, where addressed by public provisions, can raise free movement justifi-
cations and the mandatory requirements as a defence. In the Bosman applica-
tion of public law to private bodies we see the Court pursuing a functional ap-
proach to the status of a body to ensure non-discrimination.16 What emerges is 
an ever-lower tolerance level for triggering judicial scrutiny.  
(2.) The extension of competition law to the state measure:  
This leads to the second dimension of reciprocity in the traité cadre; the over-
lap between the treatment of state measures facilitating the abuse of dominance 
or cartel behaviour under Articles 2, 3(g),10, 81 and 82 EC.17 Both private 
agreements and state measures facilitating cartels or the abuse of dominance 
are addressees of the provisions. Moreover, if state measures could be ad-
dressed by competition, they could be covered by Article 28 EC.18  
(3.) The elaboration of Article 86:  
This leads to the third aspect of reciprocity, Article 86 EC providing the link: 
‘while it is true that Article 82 is directed at undertakings, nonetheless it is also 
true that the Treaty imposes a duty on Member States not to adopt or to main-
tain in force any measure which could deprive that provision of its effective-
ness.’19 We can see a tightening of the relationship between free movement 
                                                 
15  Respectively: Case 229/83, Leclerc v Au Blé Vert, [1985] ECR 1, para. 9: ‘Articles 2 
and 3 of the Treaty… establish a market characterised by the free movement of 
goods where the terms of competition are not distorted.’ Case 36/74, Walrave & 
Koch v Association Union Cycliste International et al, [1974] ECR 1405 para. 19 
‘Since... working conditions ...are governed by... provisions laid down by law or 
regulation and sometimes by agreements and other acts concluded or adopted by 
private parties, to limit the prohibitions to acts of a public authority would risk creat-
ing inequality in their application.’ See: P.J.G. Kapteyn et al. Introduction to the law 
of the European Communities (London, Kluwer, 1998) at 173. 
16  Case C-415/93, Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921 para. 86. P.J.G. Kapteyn, cited above 
note 15 at 546-51. 
17  Case 267/86, Van Eycke v ASPA, [1988] ECR 4769, para. 16. ‘Articles 81, 82… in 
conjunction with Article 10 EC, require the Member States not to introduce or main-
tain in force measures… which may render ineffective the competition rules...’ On 
reciprocity: M. Furse, Competition Law of the EC and UK, (OUP, 2006) at 281-2. 
18  Case 13/77, GB-INNO-BM v ATAB, [1977] ECR 2115 para. 35: ‘(A) national meas-
ure which has the effect of facilitating the abuse of a dominant position... will gener-
ally be incompatible with Articles 28 and 29.’ 
19  ibid. paras. 31, at 2144. 
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and competition: From Consten, and the prevention of the private circumven-
tion of free movement; to Van Eycke, and the application of competition to the 
state measure; to Electricity and the use of Article 86 EC to prevent the cir-
cumvention of free movement; and to Deutsche Post using Article 86(2) EC as 
a derogation from competition. The relationship is unstable: the influence of 
free movement on competition waxes and wanes. 
C. Non-economic public interests  
Any widening of free movement requires an evaluation of non-economic, pub-
lic interest grounds justifying non-discriminatory national measures. Deroga-
tions must: ‘…satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of 
commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.’20 This ‘rule of rea-
son’ prescribes positive integration where obstacles to trade emerge. Public 
interests which have been recognised include rules relating to the reputation of 
the financial sector, professional ethics’ rules, rules on gambling, measures on 
industrial property and cultural policy.21 Whilst this list indicates a reserved 
area of State capacity, the remarkable thing about the cases is how few of the 
Member States’ arguments were finally accepted. More important in defining 
state capacity is the level of positive integration.22 The availability of free 
movement justifications in competition depends on pre-emption; in the ab-
sence of which the Member States’ obligations will not be precise enough to 
                                                 
20  Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cas-
sis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649 at para. 8; See Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Das-
sonville, [1974] ECR 837 at 852. 
21  Reputation of financial sector: Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments v Minister van 
Financien, [1995] ECR I-1141 para. 44: ‘Maintaining the good reputation of the... 
financial sector may… constitute an imperative reason of public interest... justifying 
restrictions.’ Similar dicta: Professional ethics: Case C-3/95, Reisebüro Broede v 
Sandke, ECR I-6511 at 6540 at para. 37; Lottery regulation: Case C-275/92, Cus-
toms and Excise v Schindler, [1994] ECR I-1039 para. 61: Financial supervision: 
Case C-300/90, Commission v Belgium, [1992] ECR I-305 at 319-21. Cultural Pol-
icy: Case C-211/91, Commission v Belgium, [1992] ECR I-6757 para. 9. 
22  Respectively: P.J.G. Kapteyn, cited above note 15, at 676. In addition measures 
must be indistinctly applicable, objectively justified and proportionate. Case 120/78, 
Cassis, cited above note 20 paras. 10 and 12; Case C-407/93, Verein gegen Unwesen 
in Handel und Gewerbe e.V. v Mars GmbH, [1995] ECR I-1923 para. 24. Case 
323/93, Société Civile Agricole La Crespelle, [1994] ECR I-5080, para. 31 at 5107: 
‘…the Court has consistently held that where… Directives provide for the harmoni-
sation of… measures… (I)nvoking (Article 30) is no longer justified and the appro-
priate checks must be carried out...’  
 limit their regulatory capacity: 
‘...the purely national systems and practices in the book trade have not 
yet been made subject to a Community competition policy with which 
the Member States would be required to comply... as Community law 
stands, Member States’ obligations under Article 10... in conjunction 
with Articles 3 and 81, are not specific enough to preclude them from 
enacting legislation of the type at issue on competition in the retail 
prices of books...’23 
D. Recalibrating the focus of Competition 
The ‘November Revolution’ announced a withdrawal of EC law from Member 
States’ prerogatives. Post-Keck, the Court has refused to deal with national 
measures concerning the sale of infant formula milk, local trading-hours rules, 
national regulations on advertising, measures prohibiting sales at low margins 
and the national controls on the retail distribution of tobacco. These cases af-
firm State capacity, evidencing a de minimis test in free movement. Yet this 
was not approved in services’ or workers’ free movement contexts. In Bosman: 
‘the rules... directly affect players’ access to the… market… and are thus capa-
ble of impeding freedom of movement for workers. They cannot, thus, be 
deemed comparable to the rules on selling arrangements for goods...’24 The 
important point here is that the application to these ‘products’ of the selling 
arrangements would hinder trade; ‘selling’ people or services across borders 
must be facilitated, the local sale of goods is not for the Court to decide. This 
shift of attention to services, workers’ free movement and establishment rights 
is logical, as these areas are more important to the new Economy. Kohll and 
Decker reaffirmed these points, extending free movement into social security. 
Again, these new policy interfaces refocus competition on crucial areas of 
what was once State capacity. In bringing public measures in public health 
                                                 
23  Case 229/83, Leclerc, cited above note 15, at para. 20 at 33. 
24  N. Reich, The November Revolution of the Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi 
Revisited (1994) CMLRev 459. Subsequent case-law: Case C-391/92, Commission v 
Greece, [1995] ECR I-1621; Cases C-401 & 402/92, Tankstation ’tHeukse, [1994] 
ECR I-2199; Cases C-69 and 258/93, Punto Casa SpA v Sindaco del Commune di 
Capena, [1994] ECR I-2355; Cases 418-93, Semerano Casa Uno Srl v Sindaco del 
Commune di Ebrusco, [1996] ECR I-2975; Joined Cases C-140-142/94, DIPSpA v 
Commune di Basso di Grappa, [1995] ECR I-1621; Case C-412/93, Leclerc-Siplec v 
TF1 SA, [1995] ECR I-179; Case C-63/94, Groupement national des négociants en 
pommes de terre de Belgique, [1995] ECR I-2467; Case 387/93, Banchero, [1995] 
ECR I-4663. Case C-415/93, Bosman, cited above note 16 para. 103; Case C-
384/93, Alpine Investments, cited above note 21 para. 39. 
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provision within free movement a Dassonville approach is introduced into an 
area once insulated from EC law, subject to the caveat that the financial bal-
ance of the public service is not put at risk.25 
The implications of this are clear: Keck and Kohll/Decker limit and expand 
the scope of competition and enhance the potential to justify exemptions on 
financial equilibrium grounds. The restriction of State capacity in Centros26 
integrates further concepts into competition. Here the question was whether 
non-economic, derogation-based justifications for a restriction of competition 
can be subordinated to free movement. Otherwise stated: to what extent are 
national competition or ‘other’ laws trumped by competition and free move-
ment? Clearly, where social security, collective agreements or national rules 
regulating the labour market fall within the competition/free movement matrix 
the potential for diagonal conflict increases. Finally, as the market integrates 
policy can no longer be directed exclusively at market integration; the policy 
matrix is filled by a competition of other goals. Just as van Miert made no se-
cret of the policy competition in competition policy, Weatherill asserts the po-
rosity of the competition framework.27 In this environment the classification of 
disputes becomes more problematic, it is to these issues that attention now 
turns.  
E. The inflation of countervailing considerations 
Deutsche Post symbolises the new complexity of competition. The case re-
veals the extent of the special responsibility of the dominant undertaking and 
the compatibility of national measures with Articles 86 and 82 EC when the 
                                                 
25  Case 120/95, Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés, [1998] ECR I-1831 
para. 39, identically: Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] I-1931, para. 41: ‘...it cannot be 
excluded that the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social 
security system may constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable 
of justifying a barrier of that kind.’ 
26  Case 212/97, Centros, [1999] ECR I-1459 paras. 15-27 at 1493. 
27  K. van Miert, Die Wettbewerbspolitik der neuen Kommission, (1995) 45 WuW 553 
at 554: ‚Die Wettbewerbspolitik der Kommission findet nicht in einem Vakuum 
statt. Die hat stets auch ihre Auswirkungen in anderen Politikbereichen... mit in Be-
tracht zu ziehen, wie etwa die Industrie-, Regional-, Sozial-, und Umweltpolitik.’ S. 
Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU law (7th Ed, OUP, 2006) at 534: ‘The Treaty 
competition rules are porous: the very scope of Article 81(1) is influenced by policy 
objectives located elsewhere in the framework of EC law and policy. It is worth re-
calling that both Articles 28 and 49 EC on the free movement of goods and ser-
vices… offer… insight into the way in which the Court interprets EC trade law in a 
manner… to avoid trampling other regulatory objectives underfoot.’ 
 exercise of special or exclusive rights leads to abuse. At the heart of the dis-
pute was the issue of whether DP could charge extra payments, above ‘termi-
nal dues’, or to refuse to deliver non-physically re-mailed statements transmit-
ted from the US and sent via third countries to Germany, a practice allowed by 
International Convention.28 To the plaintiffs this constituted a price cartel (Ar-
ticle 82(c) EC) and a refusal to supply (Article 82(b) EC), the question arose 
whether these practices could be justified under Article 86(2) on SGEI 
grounds? The Court, in its ruling, stressed the place of Article 86(2) EC and 
finessed the application of competition and free movement. Yet to the Advo-
cate General the case embraced other questions: the place of the freedoms vis-
à-vis ‘other’ national law and when the avoidance of national law could be 
covered by the Treaty: the plaintiff’s motive had not been to avoid national 
law, but to engage a freedom. To the Advocate General Market integration, the 
pre-eminence of freedom to provide services, and the economic freedom of the 
independent trader were the touchstones for case resolution. 
Thus while the Court in Deutsche Post stressed the SGEI, the Advocate 
General took a free market approach. The acid question is whether liberalised 
markets can be left to their own devices or require stronger regulation to oper-
ate efficiently. Here calls for positive integration coincide with the perception 
of the Treaty as threatening both the soziale marktwirtschaft and the service 
public. Meanwhile, the recognition that diverse goals were legitimate sup-
ported a perception of the Treaty as a Constitution.29 The central paradox is 
that, as the state withdraws from the market through liberalisation and privati-
sation, it re-enters the market, whether as regulator or in the assignment of 
public service tasks. The classical divide between State and market is blurred 
as the state is privatised yet the market becomes increasingly regulated. Com-
petition is penetrated by a number of goals with the result that the task of 
drawing the boundary between public and private becomes more complex. Si-
multaneously, the inflation of policy goals threatens the market economy prin-
ciples central to the application of competition: We move into a multiple pol-
                                                 
28  S. Neu, Inlandspostgebühren bei Remailing zulässig, [2000] EuZW 281; M. Grif-
fiths, Failing to Install Effective Competition in Postal Services, [2000] ECLR 399. 
Joined Cases C-147 & 148/97, Deutsche Post AG v GZS, Citicorp GmbH [2000] 
ECR I-825 at para. 4. A. Bartosch, Casenote on Deutsche Post (2001) 38 CMLRev 
195. 
29  Respectively: M. Bergman, Regulation (London, Federal Trust, 1996) at 117; F.W. 
Scharpf, ‘Balancing Positive and Negative Integration: the Regulatory Options for 
Europe’ EUI/RSC Working Paper 97/4 at 4-5 ‘national problem-solving capacities 
are reduced by the dual constraints of more intense... competition and by the legal 
force of negative integration...’ Contra C. Veljanovski, Regulators and the Market: 
An Assessment of the Growth of Regulation in the UK (London, IEA, 1991) at 4. 
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icy arena.30  
F. Article 16: Expanding the policy matrix 
Emblematic of the new policy matrix is Article 16 EC, which confirms and 
qualifies the commitment to the market mechanism. Here, as the Commission 
has affirmed: 
‘[3] Market forces produce a better allocation of resources and greater 
effectiveness in the supply of services, the principal beneficiary being 
the consumer… [6] European societies are committed to the general in-
terest services they have created which meet basic needs. Theses ser-
vices play an important role as social cement over and above practical 
considerations... [28] ... Universal service is defined in terms of princi-
ples: equality, universality, continuity and adaptability; and in terms of 
sound practices.’31 
The Article which emerges is paradoxical: reinforcing the universal service yet 
maintaining the competition acquis, the article being without prejudice to [Ar-
ticles 73, 86 and 87 EC]. Article 16 can be seen as a step towards new demar-
cations; as recognising a third sphere of regulation and linking to the broader 
issues of governance and a limit to negative integration: 
‘Article 16... offers a rather different soil for European citizenship to 
take root in... Although it does not seem to offer the directly applicable 
individual rights... favoured in EC law, Article 16 does... suggest a dif-
ferent area to focus on: the organisation and distribution of public 
goods.’32 
The importance of Article 16 EC lies in the promotion of broader social goals. 
The broader policy base, rather than being inimical to competition, is inte-
                                                 
30  U. Immenga, Wettbewerbspolitik contra Industriepolitik nach Maastricht, [1994] 
EuZW 14 at 17: Die Vervielfältigung von Zielen, ohne ihr Rangverhältnis klarzu-
stellen führt zu einem kaum noch überprüfbaren Ermessensspielraum. Nach den 
rechtlichen Grundlagen können marktwirtschaftliche Prinzipien ihren Charakter als 
Grundlage der Gemeinschaft verlieren.’ 
31  1996 Communication: Services of General Interest in Europe [1996] OJ C281/3, 
paras. 3, 6 and 28. 
32  M. Ross, Article 16 EC and Service of General Economic Interest: from derogation 
to obligation, [2000] 25 ELRev 22 at 34-37. See: J.A. Kämmerer, Daseinsvorsorge 
als Gemeinschaftsziel oder: Europas „soziales Gewissen“, (2002) NVwZ 1041. W. 
Frenz, Dienste von allgemeinem wirtschaftlichen Interesse, (2000) Europarecht 901.  
 grated within policy.33 
G. The Three Degrees of State Incapacity 
The recalibration of competition would have been unthinkable without the 
convergence of national approaches; a convergence which has facilitated the 
decentralisation of enforcement and changed the dialogue between the national 
competition authorities. Here it is important to reflect on Articles 16 and 86(2) 
EC, the Transparency Directive and the reassertion of state capacity which 
these instruments seem to represent. Equally it is important to recognise that 
the impetus for legislation has almost always come from the Courts; and that 
the case-law confirms both the market and national prerogatives; announcing a 
‘private turn’ of public/private competition. This paper is concerned with de-
scribing the bounds of power as they have been elaborated through the compe-
tition norms. In the following sections the focus of analysis is placed on the 
three degrees of state incapacity: 
(1.)  The State as Regulator, The way in which the competition norms have 
been applied to the State in its role as regulator of the economy (Section 
II);  
(2.)  The Public Authority Function: The way the competition norms have 
been applied to the State in its ‘commercial’ and ‘public authority’ func-
tions (Section III);  
(3.)  The Public Interest: The way in which the competition norms and case-
law has developed ideas of the ‘public interest’ (Section IV).  
II. First Degree: The State as Regultator 
A. The State Measure and collusive behaviour: Articles 10, 3 (1) (g) 
and 81 EC 
Attention turns first to the State’s regulatory role.34 Under Article 10 EC na-
tional legislation may not contradict the Treaty goals, which include ensuring 
                                                 
33  COM(94) 161 23rd Competition Report 1993 at 79 ‘The Commission considers that 
far from being the… opposite of industrial policy, competition policy is an essential 
instrument, with clear complementarity between the two policies’; W. Sauter, The 
Economic Constitution of the European Union (1998) 4 CJEL 27. 
34  J. Schwarze, Der Staat als Adressat des europäischen Wettbewerbsrechts, (2000) 
EuZW 613. 
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that competition is not distorted (Article 3(1)(g) EC). National measures may 
thus not promote collusive behaviour. In precluding state measures incompati-
ble with competition law the Court in INNO v ATAB adopted a functional ap-
proach to competition; the regime being held indirectly applicable to the 
Member States.35 Such an approach implied an all-embracing test triggered by 
reference to any distortion of competition. Functionalism went further, in 
BNIC v Clair, in which reliance on the state measures by the parties was re-
jected by the Court. As the framework of the agreements and the procedural 
rules set out in State measures were irrelevant, the Court found it could go 
straight to analyse the cartel behaviour under Article 81 EC without an enquiry 
into the market distortion. In such cases the private party was precluded from 
hiding behind procedural rules, or from arguing they were an institution of 
public law.36  
This seemed subsequently approved where national legislation deprived EC 
competition law of its effect utile,37 yet was qualified in van Eycke; where it 
was held that the national measures had to involve active behaviour. This was 
held to be the case where a member state were (1) to require or favour the 
adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 81 
EC; (2) to reinforce their effects; (3) or to deprive their own legislation of offi-
cial character by delegating to private traders responsibility for taking deci-
sions.38  
The Court thus sought a link between the state measure and the undertak-
                                                 
35  Case 13/77, INNO, cited above note 18  at 2145 paras. 30-35. 
36  Case 123/83, BNIC v Clair, [1985] ECR 391 paras. 17: ‘the legal framework within 
which agreements ...are made and decisions by undertakings are taken and the clas-
sification given to that framework by the… national legal systems are irrelevant as 
far as the applicability of the Community rules on competition... are concerned.’ 
37  Case 229/83, Leclerc, cited above note 15 para. 15 at 32. Case 299/83, Saint Her-
bain v Syndicat des Libraries, [1985] ECR 2515; Case 355/85, Driancourt v Cognet, 
[1986] ECR 3231; Case 168/86, Procureur Général v Rousseau, [1987] ECR 995; 
Case 160/86, Ministère Public v Verbrugge, [1987] ECR 1783; Case 254/87, Syndi-
cat des Librairies de Normandie v L’Aigle Distribution, [1988] ECR 4457; Case 
311/85, Vlaamse Reisbureaus v Social Dienst, [1987] ECR 3801; Joined Cases 209-
213/84, Ministère Public v Asjes (Nouvelles Frontières), [1986] ECR 1425 at para. 
27 at 1471. 
38  A.B. Hoffmann, Anticompetitive State Legislation condemned under Articles 5, 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty: How far should the Court go After Van Eycke, [1990] 11 
ECLR 11. 
 ings’ conduct. This formalism was confirmed in the November Revolution.39 
In Meng the prohibition on the passing-on of commissions was contrary to the 
effet utile as it restricted competition. Yet the prohibition was held compatible 
so long as there was no direct link between the regulation and the anti-
competitive agreement; this was held the case as the parties had not reinforced 
the legislation with a private law agreement.40 We thus move to formal analy-
sis. Meng may be perceived as the fossilisation of van Eycke: the state provi-
sions neither ‘requiring nor favouring’ the conclusion of unlawful agreements; 
as they did not rubber-stamp the agreements, the provisions could not reinforce 
them. Similarly in Reiff, Ohra and Delta the price fixing by the transport tariff 
boards was held outside the cartel provisions.41 Furthermore, the tariff-setting 
power was held not to be one of delegation because the boards had to take the 
public interest into account, while the State had reserved its rights and was able 
to overturn the board’s decisions. The case-law supports the proposition that 
States may avoid competition if procedures are in place to show that the state 
is not simply ratifying anti-competitive agreements but is regulating the econ-
omy in the public interest.42 
                                                 
39  ‘November Revolution’ cases: Case C-2/91, Meng, [1993] ECR I-5751; Case C-
245/91, Ohra, [1993] ECR I-5851; Case C-185/91, Gebrüder Reiff, [1993] ECR I-
5801; Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck & Mithouard,[1993] ECR I-6097. 
40  ibid. AG Tesauro in Meng, para. 27 ‘Moreover, a solution based solely on the anti-
competitive effect of national legislation displays numerous disadvantages, insofar 
as the Court may be called upon to examine every national measure affecting the 
business activity of the undertakings, and… because of the legal uncertainty that 
would arise regarding the type of State measures that are incompatible with the 
competition rules. Even if the review of measures of that kind were merely marginal 
and limited to the appropriateness of the measure… the fact remains that the very 
possibility of verifying whether the choice made by the legislator is justified by rea-
sons relating to the public interest, and above all the question of whether or not such 
an interest takes precedence over the anticompetitive effect of the legislation in 
question, might lead to arbitrary solutions in the absence of any yardstick for the ap-
praisal of legality.’  
41  C-M. Chung, The Relationship between State Regulation and EC Competition Law, 
[1995] 16 ECLR 87 at 91.Nouvelles Frontières, cited above note 37; Case C-153/93, 
Delta Schiffahrts- und Speditionsgesellschaft, [1994] ECR I-2517. 
42  Respectively: Chalmers et al. European Union Law (CUP, 2006) at 1119. Case C-
185/91, Reiff, cited above note 39 at para. 24: ‘Articles 3(1)(g), 10 and 81... do not 
preclude the (national) rules… which provide that tariffs be set by tariff boards... if 
the members of those boards… are not representatives... but are independent experts 
called on to fix the tariffs on the basis of considerations of public interest and if the 
public authorities do not abandon their prerogatives but… ensure that the boards fix 
the tariffs by reference to considerations of public interest and, if necessary, substi-
tute their decision for that of the boards.’ 
 15
As confirmed in Italy the only way for the State to reinforce a cartel is for 
the state to tie its hands. This involves: (1) appointing partial members to the 
regulator; (2) making no provision for ministerial intervention; (3) not requir-
ing board members to take the public interest into account. Where these crite-
ria were met it was held that the Member State had: ‘wholly relinquished to 
private economic operators the powers of the public authorities as regards the 
setting of tariffs.’43 In contrast, the Court in Librandi elaborated the conditions 
for tariff-setting arrangements; these could be rubber-stamped even where the 
majority of the board are representatives of the economic agents concerned so 
long as public interests are taken into account.44 Two points stand out in these 
cases: the reciprocity and the formalistic approach adopted. Reciprocity can be 
seen in the influence of effet utile, leading to the criterion-less application of 
Community norms. Formalism is seen in that ‘only those measures which ex-
actly fitted the pattern established would be caught.’45 The retreat of EC law 
face with Member State objections can be seen as a reaction to the regime’s 
scope broadening.46  
Yet does formalism play with legal certainty? In the context of the state 
measure delegating regulatory powers to private parties uncertainty is pro-
duced in two respects. First, it is the unsophisticated arrangement wholly relin-
quishing State capacity which falls within Article 81 EC. Thus by moving 
away from effet utile we run the risk of reinforcing indirect measures distortive 
of competition, and recognise a broad justification for measures generating 
anti-competitive behaviour: the presence of procedural guarantees as defined 
by the national legislator.47 Yet this in turn can be countered with a more sub-
tle reading of the case-law, seeing the incremental constriction of state capacity 
                                                 
43  Case C-35/96, Commission v Italy, [1988] ECR I-3851 para. 57 at 3900. 
44  Case C-38/97, Autotrasporti Librandi, [1998] ECR I-5955, para. 37 ‘...the Member 
States must necessarily take account of the public interest. It is… for the Member 
States to determine the criteria which best allow the… rules of competition to be ob-
served… [I]t is then for the national courts to determine whether the public-interest 
criteria defined in the national legislation are observed in practice.’ 
45  C-M. Chung, cited above note 41 at 89 ‘only those measures which exactly fitted the 
pattern established would be caught.’ 
46  N. Reich, November Revolution cited above note 39, at 478: ‘…an inherent contra-
diction exists… between ‘supranationalism’ and ‘intergovernmentalism’: the more 
the Community jurisdiction expands, the more the Member States are keen to keep 
their prerogatives...’ 
47  W. Sauter, Competition law and Industrial Policy in the EU, (OUP, 1997) at 147: 
‘The Court will declare illegal restrictions of competition by… cartel whereas legis-
lative or regulatory solutions of the same content are acceptable, in so far as they re-
spect the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality.’ 
 as being in accordance with the EC commitment to the free market: 
‘Where the public authorities make use of Committees of financially in-
terested parties unencumbered by serious public interest obligations, it is 
perfectly proper… to insist that these authorities consult affected parties 
and retain and exercise the power to reject of amend proposals made by 
those committees. It should just not pretend that the committee is not an 
‘association of undertakings’. Where the public authorities delegate 
regulatory powers to self-regulatory bodies, it is perfectly proper… to 
insist that these bodies have balanced interest representation and internal 
decision-making procedures that ensure that all concerned third parties 
have the chance to voice their opinions and have these taken into due 
account. It should just not pretend that the authorities have not ‘dele-
gated’ decision-making power. And where, as in Reiff, there are doubts 
on both these scores, it should not pretend to settle two different issues 
but should consider whether all elements combined – from the status of 
the individual members as ‘independent experts’ to the obligation in-
cumbent on the committee as a whole to take the ‘public interest’ into 
account and to consult affected third parties, to the provision granting 
the Minister at least the theoretical possibility to reject the committee’s 
proposals – are sufficient to pass the test of public-regarding legisla-
tion.’48    
Thus the Court protects regulatory arrangements where a plausible proce-
dural case can be put for preferring the public to the private interests: 
‘Albeit very implicitly, the Court has fashioned a public interest test that 
transforms Community competition law into a rudimentary set of proce-
dural norms of good governance for private regulation. It is a set of 
norms that recognises that the legitimacy of economic self-regulation 
depends on procedures that ensure the meaningful participation of all 
concerned parties rather than on hierarchical structures of formal politi-
cal accountability. In that sense, the ‘delegation’ test contributes to the 
constitutionalisation of private governance.’49   
This echoes the invocation of the relevance of proceduralism in Europeanisa-
tion: that what is sacrosanct are the guarantees of good governance. What 
should not be lost sight of, however, is that pursuant to a ruling of incompati-
bility of state measures, the state is liable to claims for damages if it does not 
act, a strong incentive, as Chalmers et al observe, to remove anti-competitive 
                                                 
48  H. Schepel, Delegation of Regulatory powers to Private Parties under EC Competi-
tion law: towards a Procedural Public Interest Test, (2002) 39 CMLRev. 31. 
49  ibid. at 35. 
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legislation. Since Fiammifieri it is clear that national competition authorities 
enjoy a broad power to review national regulation affecting local markets on 
the basis of private complaints.50 The invocation to good governance is thus 
lent a further twist, the ethos of ‘good governance’ is incrementally erosive of 
state capacity a technocratisation is advanced, with the commanding heights 
controlled from Brussels.  
B. State measures and dominance: Articles 10, 3 (1)(g) and 82 EC  
Yet another respect in which legal certainty is eroded, is that the Court rejects 
the formal approach of Article 81 EC/state measure analysis in the context of 
Article 82 EC. Clearly, state measures may not promote the abuse of domi-
nance by one or more undertakings: 
[27] ‘The Court has held that Articles [3(1)(g), 10 and 82 EC]… could 
only apply to legislation… if it were proved that the legislation… placed 
an undertaking in a position of economic strength enabling it to prevent 
effective competition from being maintained on the relevant market...’51 
Here the Court holds with functionalism. Abuse of dominance results from the 
measure in either of two situations: (1) if the legislation induces the abuse, re-
gardless of whether an abuse has occurred, or; (2) where the potential abuse is 
the direct consequence of national law. By asserting formalism in State meas-
ure/cartel analysis and allowing the national courts power to determine nation-
ally expressed public interests, the Court shuts off justification of the national 
measures by reference to exemption grounds laid down in Article 81(3) EC.  
C. The public interest justification under Article 86(2) EC 
In contrast, state measures benefiting the public/private sector undertaking, 
where that undertaking has been granted special or exclusive rights may be 
justified by the public interest test in Article 86(2) subject to necessity and 
proportionality.52 Again, the existence or creation of such rights is not incom-
                                                 
50  Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammifieri, [2003] ECR I-8055; P. Nebbia, 
Case-note (2004) CMLRev 839: ‘suggesting in fact… that the Commission deregu-
lates the economy in sectors of general Community importance while NCAs deregu-
late… state measures that affect local markets.’  
51  Case C-38/97, Librandi, cited above note 44 paras. 26 and 27 at 5982. 
52  Case C-320/91, Criminal Proceedings against Paul Corbeau, [1993] ECR I-2533; 
Case C-323/93, La Crespelle, para. 27 at 5106; Case 26/75, General Motors, [1975] 
ECR 1367, para. 12; Case 226/84, British Leyland, [1986] ECR 3263 para. 27. 
 patible rather it is their operation that must be compatible with Treaty objec-
tives.53 Article 86(1) EC, via its expansive interpretation, has been important in 
opening up natural monopolies. By extension, the derogation provided for in 
Article 86(2) EC has proved significant in recalibrating the bounds of power; 
curtailing the scope of activities for public undertakings. Furthermore, refer-
ence to Article 86 EC allows justification not only on the grounds of the pro-
tection of a SGEI but also by reference to the public interest exceptions in Ar-
ticles 30, 46 and 55 EC and the mandatory requirements.54 Thus an area of dis-
tortions of competition non-discriminatory in their application, fall outside the 
realm of Competition law. What is problematic is that the outcome depends; 
on the head under which the state measure is challenged: 
‘Under Article 86(2) EC both economic and non-economic defences are 
admissible. This amounts to a special regime for SGEI... Where exclu-
sive or special rights are contested under Article 86(1) and 82 EC... no 
public interest derogations exist... Where 86(1) is applied… with Article 
49, only non-economic justifications in the general interest may be con-
sidered. After Keck, where Article 86(1) is applied together with 28 EC, 
distortions of competition... which do not discriminate between under-
takings by nationality will be allowed...’55 
The fragility of these rules is striking: Article 86 EC sets flexible tests for the 
bounds of power. A subtle network emerges, and while the State is constrained 
in its regulation of the economy, the case law confirms sensitivity to state pre-
rogatives.  
III. Second Degree: The Public Authority Function 
A. Absolute Competition vs. Absolute sovereignty 
As the State has withdrawn from the Market it has exposed state enterprises to 
                                                 
53  Case 155/73, Sacchi, [1974] ECR 409 para. 14 at 429. 
54  Respectively: Case 18/88, RTT v GB-INNO-BM SA, [1991] ECR 5941 para. 28: 
‘Accordingly… Articles 3(1)(g), 86 and 82 EC preclude a Member State from grant-
ing to the undertaking which operates the… network the power to lay down stan-
dards for… equipment… when it is itself competing… on the market...’ Public in-
terest: Case 72/83, Campus Oil v Minister for Industry and Energy, [1984] ECR 
2727; Case C-347/88, Commission v Greece, [1990] ECR I-4747. Establishment: 
Case C-260/89, ERT v DEP, [1991] ECR I-2925 at 2960-2961 and Case C-353/89, 
Commission v The Netherlands, [1991] ECR I-4069 at 4097-4098; Case C-202/88, 
France v Commission (Telecom Terminals), [1992] ECR I-1223 at 1267-1269. 
55  W. Sauter, cited above note 47, at 152. 
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competition and assigned public tasks to the private sector. A crucial element 
of competition is thus the determination of the extent to which State functions 
may be open to competition. Given the variable levels of state intervention, 
some elaboration of when the state activity is that of a public authority, and 
when it is in the nature of a commercial activity is needed. Some guidance is 
supplied by secondary law prescribing liberalisation, the most important fea-
ture of which is that the measures require a functional definition of the public 
body.56 Both privatised undertakings and the State as operator of economic 
activities are embraced by the directives. The role of the Court is to demarcate 
the ‘public authority’ functions and the ‘private/ commercial’ activities using 
the secondary law; resolving cases by reference to the general interest.57 How-
ever, such liberalisation is ultimately either eroded or replaced by competition: 
either the privatised company can no longer be held to the procurement provi-
sions or those provisions are lent competition criteria.58 In the transition from 
State to market either competition replaces the directives or the directives are 
penetrated by competition. 
B. Commercial activity vs. Public Authority function 
Where commercial activities are found then competition applies. Recalling that 
whether a set of activities has been entrusted to a public body is not determina-
tive. What is important for a finding that the activities are of a commercial na-
ture is whether the activity could potentially be subject to competition.59 A pri-
vatising thrust, questioning the priorities set by the State emerges; almost 
every activity could be subject to competition. Nevertheless, some functions 
find themselves within the sphere of state capacity. The Advocate General in 
SAT Fluggesellschaft treating air traffic control as an activity in which ‘any 
idea of commercial exploitation is alien.’ Similarly the Court held that anti-
pollution surveillance was a public task outside competition.60 
                                                 
56  Case C-188/89, Foster v British Gas, [1991] ECR I-3313 para. 20. 
57  Case C-44/96, Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria v STROHAL, [1998] ECR I-73 at 
117-118 para. 39.  
58  S. Arrowsmith, Deregulation of Utilities Procurement in the Changing Economy: 
towards a Principled Approach? [1997] 18 ECLR 420. 
59  Respectively: Case C-41/90, Höfner & Elsner v Macrotron, [1991] ECR I-1979 
para. 21. Case C-244/94, Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance v Ministère 
de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche, [1995] ECR I-4013 para. 17. 
60  Respectively: Case C-364/92, SAT Fluggesellschaft v Eurocontrol, [1994] ECR I-
43, para. 13, at 52. Case C-343/95, Diego Cali & Figli v Servizi Ecologici Porto di 
Genova SpA, [1997] ECR I-1547. AG Cosmas para. 41: ‘…certain bodies… are the 
 C. Mixed Functions: dissociable services and protectable cores 
Beyond this the Court has adopted subtle parameters where public and private 
functions are mixed. The Court has found that it could divorce commercial and 
public functions. Where, however, the regulatory functions place the undertak-
ings at an obvious advantage those functions have to be removed.61 Mean-
while, the case-law on natural monopolies displays a similar dynamic to the 
social policy elaboration of general non-economic public interest and the uni-
versal supply criteria under Article 86(2) EC. In Sacchi the Court held that: 
‘Nothing in the Treaty prevents Member States for considerations of public 
interest of a non-economic nature from removing radio and TV transmissions... 
from the field of competition.’ At the same time, a functional approach can be 
seen in Ahmed Saeed, suggesting Commission competence to prohibit the exis-
tence of Treaty rights.62 A competence to control the exercise rather than the 
existence of such rights is suggested by a third line of authority.63 Any assign-
ment of regulatory functions has to satisfy the mandatory requirements of ne-
cessity, alternative means and proportionality, leaving minimal room for State 
intervention. 
The scope of Article 86 was clarified in Corbeau where it was held that the 
private party may not cherry pick where this threatens the economic equilib-
rium of the public task:  
‘the exclusion of competition is not justified as regards specific services 
dissociable from the service of general interest which meet special needs 
                                                                                                                                                     
instruments of… public policy in the general public interest... bodies that exercise an 
activity typical of a public authority or have an exclusively social function, do not 
constitute undertakings and are not… subject to the… rules on competition.” “[42] 
In reaching those conclusions, the Court of Justice has focused on the nature of the 
activity exercised... whether or not it is of an economic nature and whether it could... 
be performed by a private… undertaking... Basically, the court has assessed the ex-
tent to which the entity… operates in compliance with the rules laid down by the 
administrative authorities and, whether… it has the power to influence the level of 
consideration demanded.’ 
61  Respectively: Case 258/78, Nungesser v Commission, [1982] ECR 2015 para. 8; 
Case 18/88, RTT, cited above note 54 paras. 25-26. 
62  Respectively: Case 155/73, Sacchi, cited above note 53 [1974] ECR 409 at para. 14. 
Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen, [1989] ECR 838; M. Van der Woude, Article 
90: Competing for competence [1991] ELRev Competition Checklist 60. 
63  W. Basedow, Europarechtliche Grenzen des Postmonopols [1994] EuZW 359, 3 
types of abuse: (1.) Where the Rights’ holder is unable to satisfy demand (Höfner); 
(2.) Where the holder can be expected to engage in excessive/discriminatory pricing 
(Porto di Genova); (3.) Where there is an extension into ancillary markets. 
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of economic operators and which call for certain additional services not 
offered by the traditional postal service… in so far as such specific ser-
vices... do not compromise the economic equilibrium of the SGEI...’ 64 
Corbeau has been divergently interpreted.65 The consensus is that in core 
areas of the universal service competition can be excluded, as well as in areas 
necessary for the survival of the core, value-added services dissociable from 
the core should be subject to competition. The Commission went on to inte-
grate Corbeau into its liberalisation of postal services.66 Yet the transitional 
approach agreed to by the Member States led to knock-on problems: (1) the 
cross-subsidisation of non-reserved activities via profits made in the reserved 
sector; and (2) the use of funds generated in the reserved sector to finance joint 
ventures with a view to market foreclosure.67 The leniency can be explained: 
‘consolidation facilitates the adjustment of the industry and… may allow for 
the elimination of a reserved sector as the providers of the universal services 
will have a sufficiently diversified portfolio to make the universal service… 
sustainable without the need for monopoly profits…’68 In Almelo a further 
shift was seen. The public interest justification rather than the abuse was the 
focus of enquiry, the Court asking whether the restraint was necessary and 
proportionate. Here the definition of State capacity was widened from the dis-
sociable service to a protectable core of public functions.69 Subsequently, this 
assertion of definitional power was underscored in Electricity. Again in 
Deutsche Post the Court placed universal supply at centre-stage:  
‘The postal services cannot simultaneously bear the costs entailed in the 
performance of the SGEI...which is their responsibility under the UPC 
and the loss of income resulting from the fact that bulk mailings are no 
                                                 
64  Case C-320/91, Criminal Proceedings against Paul Corbeau, [1993] ECR I-2533 
para. 19 at 2569. 
65  L. Hancher, Casenote [1994] CMLRev 105 at 111: ‘heralding the end of monopoly 
rights and... as an endorsement of those rights’. 
66  Directive 97/67/EC rules for the development of the internal market of Community 
Postal Services and the improvement of quality of service, (1998) OJ L15/14, as 
amended by Directive 2002/39/EC (2002) OJ L176/21. D. Geradin (ed.) The Liber-
alisation of Postal Services in the European Union (The Hague, Kluwer, 2002). Core 
activities or ‘reserved sector’ and dissociable services: Articles 7 and 9. Regulatory 
framework: Article 22. Directive 2002/39/EC sought to address cross-subsidisation 
of activities (Article 12). 
67  Cross subsidisation: Case T-175/99, UPS Europe SA v. Commission [2002] ECR II-
1915 para. 66. 
68  Chalmers et al. cited above, note 42 at 1151. 
69  Case C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo, [1994] ECR I-1477 at para. 61. 
 longer posted with the postal services of the Member State in which the 
addressees are resident.’70  
Rather than viewing the transposition of the UPC as a state measure frustrating 
the freedom to provide services, the transposition was treated as reflecting the 
public interest.71 Only the Advocate General broached the subject of whether 
the delivery of remailings threatened the provision of the universal service.  
Recalling the discretion originally lent the State in social security the ele-
ments required of the public authority task were first indicated in Poucet & 
Pistre, where the way in which the insurance scheme was financed was crucial 
in determining whether the necessary element of solidarity was present. As the 
benefits in Poucet & Pistre were redistributional, rather than proportional to 
premiums this was held to be the case. Yet the court set restrictive criteria for 
the delineation of the public interest function.72 These criteria were elaborated 
in Fédération Francaise, where it was held that three points were central: (1) 
the discretional nature of the scheme precluded solidarity; (2) the scheme was 
less competitive compared to private provision; (3) though organised on a non-
profit basis, the activity was of an economic character.73 The contours set to 
the public authority task were refined in Albany. Though the Court found that 
certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements, a 
functional approach to the measure was rejected; the court found that neither 
the collective agreement, nor the state measure came within EC competition 
law.74 
                                                 
70  Joined Cases C-147 & 148/97, Deutsche Post, cited above note 28 at para. 4. 
71  ibid. para. 44: ‘performance of the obligations flowing from the UPC is ... in itself a 
SGEI within the meaning of Article 86(2) of the Treaty.’   
72  Joined Cases C-159 & 160/91, Poucet & Pistre v Assurances Générales de France, 
[1993] ECR I-637, [18] ‘Sickness funds, and... organisations involved in... the public 
social security system, fulfil an exclusively social function. That activity is based on 
the principle of national solidarity and is entirely non-profit-making. The benefits 
paid out are statutory… bearing no relation to the amount of contributions.’ 
73  Case C-244/94, Fédération française, cited above note 59 at paras. 19–21 at 4029: 
74  Case C-67/96, Albany, [1999] ECR I-5741. para. 54 ‘…agreements concluded in the 
context of collective negotiations... must… be regarded as falling outside the scope 
of Article 81(1)of the Treaty...(T)he decision of the public authorities to make af-
filiation to such a fund compulsory does not fall within the categories of… measures 
which... undermine the effectiveness of Articles 3, 10 and 81.’ (Joined Cases C-115-
117/97 Brentjens, [1999] ECR I-6025; C-219/97 Bokken, [1999] ECR I-6121.) See: 
R.J. Van den Bergh & P. Camesasca, Irreconcilable Principles? The Court of Justice 
exempts Collective Labour Agreements from the wrath of Antitrust, (2000) 25 EL-
Rev 492; L. Gyselen, Case-note on Albany, Brentjens’ and Bokken (2000) 37 
CMLRev 425.  
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Yet the question whether the fund in Albany was an undertaking and sub-
ject to competition was more problematic. The Court held that because the 
schemes were not of basic provision they fell within the more restrictive 
Fédération Francaise definition of undertakings engaging in an economic ac-
tivity. The Court went on to hold that such ‘manifestations of solidarity,’ are of 
essential importance under Article 86(2) EC as they could ‘justify the exclu-
sive right of such a body to manage a supplementary pension scheme.’ Though 
the scheme qualified as an undertaking, this merely brought the system within 
the competition regime. Thus the Court justified national prerogatives, on the 
basis of a lack of State capacity to otherwise tackle the problem of pension 
provision. Again, the Court stressed the prerogatives of the state.75 The sup-
plementary coverage fulfils an essential social function. It was not necessary 
for the Fund to establish that its viability would otherwise have been jeopard-
ised but that the performance of the assigned tasks had to be ensured under 
economically acceptable conditions. Here the ‘manifestations of solidarity’ 
came to the fore: 
‘The progressive departure of ‘good’ risks would leave the… pension 
fund with responsibility for an increasing number of ‘bad’ risks, thereby 
increasing the cost of pensions for workers, particularly those in small 
and medium-sized undertakings with older employees engaged in dan-
gerous activities...’76 
The constraints inherent in the schemes in Electricity, Kohll and Dekker, and 
Albany justified the exclusive rights. Further, the Member States were held to 
enjoy a ‘wide margin of discretion... in organising their social security sys-
tems.’77 Again, amongst the variety of approaches suggested by the Advocate 
                                                 
75  ibid. paras. 96 and 103. ‘In allowing... derogations... Article 86(2)... seeks to recon-
cile… States’ interests in using certain undertakings… as an instrument of economic 
or fiscal policy with the Community’s interest in ensuring compliance with the rules 
on competition and preservation of the unity of the… market.’ 
76  ibid. para. 108. 
77  ibid. AG Jacob’s on the types of approach to Article 86: (1.) ERT-type case-law, the 
grant of exclusive rights in too many markets para. 400; (2.) Höfner-type case-law, 
the grant of exclusivity in one market only para. 408 and (3.) Corbeau-type case-
law, on the applicability of EC law para. 420. Concluding at para. 437: ‘…when 
Member States define the SGEI… they cannot be precluded from taking account of 
national policy objectives. In that respect… Member States retain competence to 
organise their social security systems. They therefore have a wide margin of 
discretion in that area.’ Article 81(3) EC as safeguard: Joined Cases C-180-184/98, 
Pavel Pavlov & Others, [2000] ECR I-6451, AG at para. 90, AG Léger in Case C-
309/99, Wouters and others v Algemeene Raad van de Nederlands Ordre van 
 General much depends on the nature of the market under consideration and its 
proximity to genuine social or state functions, and the comparison of whether 
such services as are supplied via a special or exclusive right in one country are 
not typically delivered under competitive conditions in another. Again, it is for 
the Member State to make its case for protection on the basis of the public in-
terest.78  
The concretisation of exemptions has been crucial to demarcating the public 
authority function. In the case-law both sensitivity to Member States’ preroga-
tives and a concern to secure economic readjustment is reflected. Importantly, 
concretisation has been seen in social security, with the emergence of a subtle 
demarcation of ‘cherry picking’. Three lines of argument explain these delimi-
tations. (1) In competition we may be dealing with internal situations where 
Member States may be hostile to intervention; (2) A common rationale on the 
conditions under which cross-subsidies are acceptable emerges; (3) We can 
interpret these cases in terms of pragmatism: the Community opportunistically 
intervening where it perceives national resistance is weak, whilst resorting to 
the policy interface in hard cases.  
IV. Third Degree: The Public Interest 
Potentially, the scope of factors which can justify exemption or special treat-
ment under the competition provisions centre on the pursuit of the public inter-
est. The issue which emerges from this is how to guarantee that competition is 
in fact instituted. Here Articles 31 and 86 EC are the touchstones in demarcat-
ing the public interest. National or EC public interests may be influenced by 
policy or political considerations and a stark choice may emerge between pur-
suing anti-competitive agreements and reforming the organisation of the mar-
ket.79 
                                                                                                                                                     
Advocaten, [2002] ECR I-1577. See: E. Deards, Closed Shop versus one stop shop: 
the battle goes on, (2002) ELRev 618.  
78  L. Hancher, Community, State and Market, in P. Craig & G. De Burca (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU law (OUP, 1998) 721 at 731-735.  
79  Case T-110/95, IECC v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3706 para. 59 at 3629: ‘The 
Commission was... entitled to take the view that... it was preferable… to promote the 
ongoing reform of the terminal dues system rather than penalising that system by a 
decision prohibiting the CEPT Agreement.’ 
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A. Article 86 EC  
As seen in Corbeau, Höfner and Porto di Genova, Article 86, in conjunction 
with 81 and 82 EC, precludes the abusive exercise of exclusive rights, seen 
inter alia in Job Centre.80 In Cara the salient factors in a breach of Article 86 
EC were elaborated in the context of a private employment agency: 
‘A member state… is in breach of Article 86(1) EC... in the following 
circumstances: - the public placement offices are manifestly unable to 
satisfy demand on the market for all types of activity; and - the actual 
placement of the employed by private companies is rendered impossible 
by the maintenance in force of statutory provisions under which such ac-
tivities are prohibited… ; and - the placement activities in question could 
extend to the nationals or to the territory of other Member States.’81  
The character of Article 86 EC has changed, affected by the emergence of Ar-
ticle 86(2) EC as a means for exempting ‘the SGEI or having the character of a 
revenue producing monopoly.’ The introduction of Article 16 EC confirms the 
importance of Article 86(2) EC. The essence of Article 86(2), finds expression 
in France v Commission: ‘that provision seeks to reconcile the Member States’ 
interest in using certain undertakings… as an instrument of economic and fis-
cal policy with the Community’s interest in ensuring compliance with the rules 
on competition and the preservation of the unity of the common market.’82 
More recently, in Calafiori, the Court has confirmed that the grant of special or 
exclusive rights does not constitute a breach of the competition provisions. Ar-
ticle 86(1) and 82 EC are only contravened where the undertaking: ‘merely by 
exercising the… rights… is led to abuse its dominant position or where such 
rights are liable to create a situation in which that undertaking is led to commit 
such abuses.’83  
                                                 
80  Respectively: P.J.G. Kapteyn et al., cited above note 15, at 932-3. D. Edward & M. 
Hoskins, Article 90: Deregulation and EC law. Reflections arising from the XVI 
FIDE conference [1995] 32 CMLRev 157 at 172-3. Case C-55/96, Job Centre, 
[1997] ECR I-7119 para. 31: ‘A Member State will contravene the prohibition... 
only if the undertakings... by exercising the exclusive right... cannot avoid abusing 
its dominant position...’ 
81  Case C-258/98, Criminal Proceedings against Giovani Cara & others, [2000] ECR 
I-4217 para. 13. 
82  Case C-202/88, Telecom Terminals, cited above note 54 paras. 11-12. 
83  Case C-451/03, Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti v Calafiori, [2006] ECR I-
2941. 
 B. SGEI Derogation under Article 86(2) EC 
As the criteria for state monopolies rely on public policy aims we witness, in 
the Article 31/86 EC interplay, the elaboration of public interest defences. In 
Almelo, the Court assessed the national electricity supply arrangements and 
held that, whilst they may have had the effect of compartmentalising the mar-
ket, Article 86(2) EC allowed an SGEI derogation. This was extended in Elec-
tricity with the twist that even if the arrangements were caught by Article 31 
EC they could be justified by reference to Article 86(2) EC.84 A striking aspect 
is the contrast between the benevolence towards public utilities under Article 
86(2) EC with the tighter demarcation of nationally defined free movement, 
social security public interests in Kohll and Decker. Without a public interest 
justification privileged market positions are contrary to Article 86(1) EC.85 If 
the services are organised as full monopolies, they are incompatible with Arti-
cle 31 EC. Yet once Article 86(2) EC is engaged, a permissive attitude to ac-
ceptable ‘public’ practices sweeps the field: discrimination, cross-
subsidisation, even the elimination of competition, is allowed.86 Where such 
services are not supplied by ‘undertakings’, or the Article 86(2) EC derogation 
applies, competition can be excluded.  
(1.) SGEI not provided by an ‘undertaking’:  
Given the Article 86(2) EC exemption it is curious that the Courts have ruled 
some SGEI outside competition law because they are not delivered by under-
takings pursuing an economic activity.87 Here the Court has looked to whether 
the services can be subsumed within the ‘essential functions of the state’ with 
                                                 
84  Electricity cases, cited above note 13. Case C-157/94 [24] ‘Since the maintenance of 
the exclusive import and export rights at issue is… contrary to Article 31… it is un-
necessary to consider whether they are contrary to Articles 28 and 29 or… whether 
they might… be justified under 30… [25]... Nevertheless it is still necessary to ver-
ify whether the exclusive rights… might be justified... under 86(2).’ 
85  ibid. C-157/94 Netherlands, cited above note 13 para. 30: ‘that... Member States do 
not take advantage of their.. relations with those undertakings... to evade the prohibi-
tions laid down by other Treaty rules... such as those in [Articles 28, 29 and 31], by 
obliging or encouraging (them) to engage in conduct which, if engaged in by the 
Member States, would be contrary to those rules.’ 
86  W. Möschel, Service Public und europäischer Binnenmarkt, (2003) JZ 1021 at 1025.  
87  As Chalmers et al. Cited above, note 42 at 1136 observe: ‘It is not clear why the 
Court did not just declare that social security operators are undertakings subject to 
competition law, but that the restriction of competition may be justified under Arti-
cle 86(2) EC – after all, the provision of social security benefits premised upon no-
tions of solidarity seems to be a quintessential service of general economic interest.’  
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the powers granted to the companies being those typically exercised by a ‘pub-
lic authority’. Anti-pollution services, for example, fall within the protected 
area of the public authority function.88 Otherwise, services will fall outside the 
commercial sphere, and outside the application of competition, where they re-
late to (1) the State regulation of healthcare and social security; (2) are organ-
ised on the basis of solidarity. Solidarity, as elaborated in Cisal di Battistello/ 
INAIL, requires that: (1) the benefits of a particular method of organising the 
delivery of the service do not stand in strict relation to contributions; and: (2) 
that the State has reserved rights to supervise the service.89  
The Court’s approach centres on the level of solidarity of the scheme. Re-
cently, two cases in healthcare services have lent the SGEI a wide ambit, ex-
tending the concept of the SGEI to the commercial transactions connected with 
the provision of such services. In FENIN the central buyer for healthcare 
equipment was accused of abusing its monopoly position by delaying pay-
ments to suppliers.90 In AOK Bundesverband a German sickness fund was ac-
cused of collusion in price-fixing to patients’ detriment. Both practices were 
found to be outside the realm of ‘economic activity’ and within the sphere of 
the SGEI, ‘integrally connected’ to the funds’ public service activity.91 
(2.) Application of Article 86(2) EC:  
Article 86(2) EC provides that Member States, undertakings and revenue-
producing monopolies may derogate from their EC law obligations when these 
would obstruct the performance of the SGEI.92 Four elements are required for 
this derogation: (1) The undertaking must have been ‘entrusted’ with the pro-
                                                 
88  Case C-343/95, Diego Cali, cited above note 60 (AG Cosmas at para. 41). 
89  Case C-218/00, Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas v INAIL, [2002] ECR I-691. 
para. 44. ‘…it is clear… that the amount of benefits and the amount of contribu-
tions… are subject to supervision by the State and that the compulsory affiliation 
which characterises such an insurance scheme is essential for the financial balance 
of the scheme and for application of the principle of solidarity, which means that the 
benefits paid to insured persons are not strictly proportionate to the contributions 
paid by them.’  
90  Case T-319/99, FENIN v. Commission [2003] ECR II-357. 
91  Case C-264, 306, 354 & 355/01, AOK Bundesverband, [2004] ECR I-2493 para. 63: 
‘(T)he fund associations do not pursue a specific interest separable from the exclu-
sively social objective of the sickness funds. On the contrary, in making such a de-
termination, the fund associations perform an obligation which is integrally con-
nected with the activity of the sickness funds within the framework of the German 
statutory health insurance scheme.’  
92  Case C-438/02 Hanner, [2005] ECR I-4551 para. 47. 
 vision of a public service;93 (2) it must be charged with the provision of a 
SGEI;94 (3) a derogation from competition law must be required to ensure the 
provision of the SGEI: but for a derogation, the services would not be provided 
because they are unprofitable;95 (4) the resulting distortion of competition can-
not compromise wider EU interests.96  
(3.) Elaboration of the SGEI:  
The 1996 Communication on the SGEI, the introduction of Article 16 into the 
Treaty via the Amsterdam Treaty and the 2004 White Paper have helped to 
elaborate the SGEI.97 In the 1996 Communication the Commission averred that 
the SGEI constituted a keystone in the European economic and social model.98 
In the cases we see how the SGEI has been developed: in the provision of pub-
lic utilities the conditions of universal supply at reasonable cost must be met, 
provided that the scope of rights conferred is necessary and proportionate: 
                                                 
93  Case C-203/96, Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV, [1998] ECR I-4075. (AG 
Jacobs at para. 103).  
94  2000 Communication, Services of General Interest in Europe, (2000) OJ C17/4 An-
nex II: ‘market services which the Member States or the Community subject to spe-
cific public service obligations by virtue of a general interest criterion. This… 
cover(s) such things as transport networks, energy and communications.’ 
95  Case 475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner, [2001] ECR I-8089 paras. [61]‘…the extension of 
the medical aid organisations’ exclusive rights to the non-emergency transport sec-
tor… enable(s) them to discharge their general-interest task of providing emergency 
transport in conditions of economic equilibrium. The possibility which would be 
open to private operators to concentrate, in the non-emergency sector, on more prof-
itable journeys could affect the degree of economic viability of the service provided 
by the medical aid organisations and… jeopardise the quality and reliability of that 
service.’ [62]: ‘…it is only if it were established that the… organisations entrusted 
with the operation of the public ambulance service were manifestly unable to satisfy 
demand for emergency ambulance services and for patient transport at all times that 
the justification for extending their exclusive rights, based on the task of the general 
interest, could not be accepted.’ See: P.J. Slot, Applying the Competition Rules in 
the Healthcare Sector (2003) ECLR 580.   
96  Case C-157/94, Netherlands, cited above note 13, paras. 66-71. 
97  Communication on Services of General Interest 1996 [1996] OJ C281/3; 2004 White 
Paper on the Service of General Interest COM(2004) 374 final. 
98  ibid. at para. 6: ‘European societies are committed to the general interest services 
they have created... These services play an important role as social cement over and 
above practical considerations. They also have a symbolic value, reflecting a sense 
of community that people can identify with. They form part of the cultural identity 
of everyday life in all European countries.’ 
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[15] ‘…the Régie des Postes is entrusted with a SGEI consisting in the 
obligation to collect carry and distribute mail on behalf of all users... at 
uniform tariffs and on similar quality conditions, irrespective of the spe-
cific situations or the degree of economic profitability of each individual 
operation. [19] However the exclusion of competition is not justified as 
regards specific services dissociable from the SGEI which meets special 
needs of economic operators and which call for certain additional ser-
vices not offered by the traditional post office... in so far as such specific 
services, by their nature and the conditions in which they are offered... 
do not compromise the economic equilibrium of the SGEI performed by 
the holder of the exclusive right.’99 
Corbeau dissociability or Almelo protectability may be determined by refer-
ence to the superior value and market demand criteria set out in Höfner and 
reiterated in Corbeau, or by reference to the economic equilibrium of service, 
an equilibrium which has been interpreted generously: the economic survival 
of the SGEI need not hang in the balance.100 
Whilst acknowledging that national courts face difficulties in balancing the 
interests in charting the scope of the SGEI, the Court has supplied some pa-
rameters: ‘that burden of proof cannot be so extensive as to require the mem-
ber states... to… prove positively, that no other conceivable measure… could 
enable those tasks to be performed under the same conditions.’101 In Deutsche 
Post the Court went further, the need for economic analysis was shut off by the 
holding that the postal operator could not simultaneously bear the costs of the 
SGEI and the loss of revenue resulting from competition in non-physical re-
mailing. The Advocate General was sceptical as to whether this was enough, 
holding that, if Article 86(2) EC was to be relied upon DP should have to sub-
                                                 
99  Case C-230/91, Corbeau, cited above note 52 paras. 15 and 19. Similarly: Case C-
393/92, Almelo, cited above note 70 para. 48 at 1521: ‘all consumers… receive unin-
terrupted supplies... in sufficient quantities... at uniform tariff rates and on terms 
which may not vary save in accordance with objective criteria.’ 
100  Followed in: Decision 90/456/EEC Spanish International Courier Services (1990) 
OJ L233/19, Decision 90/16/EEC Dutch express Delivery Services (1990) OJ 
L10/47. Case C-157/94, Netherlands, cited above note 13 at paras. 52-3. [52] it is 
not necessary... for the conditions for the application of Article 86(2) EC to be ful-
filled, that the financial balance or the economic equilibrium of the undertaking... 
should be threatened. It is sufficient that... it would not be possible for the undertak-
ing to perform the particular tasks entrusted to it... [53]… it follows... that the condi-
tions... are fulfilled... if maintenance of those rights is necessary to enable the 
holder... to perform the SGEI tasks assigned to it under economically acceptable 
conditions.’ 
101  Cases C-159/94, France, cited above note 13 at paras. 101 and 58. 
 stantiate its assertion.102 
The Court did not follow the Advocate General despite case-law supporting 
the proposition that the terminal dues system had to be reformed until the sys-
tem fully reflected costs.103 The Court, in accepting DP’s case, contradicted its 
own case-law and the logic of the postal directive (97/67/EC). Moreover, the 
Court defied the logic of the Commission’s decision on the REIMS II postal 
agreement. In considering whether any increase above the 70% ceiling would 
be justifiable the Commission decided that further information was neces-
sary.104 The Court’s position in Deutsche Post can be read in terms of indus-
trial policy, as aimed at helping undertakings to readjust. The ruling may also 
be interpreted as relating more to the Member States than the undertakings, 
allowing Member States to privatise at a premium rather than engaging a more 
economic approach. The function of Article 86(2) EC is thus also as an instru-
ment concerned with protecting national economic and fiscal interests. This 
economic/fiscal understanding of Article 86(2) EC was tied to the previously 
elaborated dissociable service/protectable core logic of the Article in Ferring, 
where the compatibility of a tax advantage with the competition rules fell for 
consideration: 
[31] ‘Under Article [86(2)]… undertakings entrusted with the operation 
of SGEI or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall 
be subject to the rules contained in the Treaty in so far as the application 
of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the 
                                                 
102  Cases C-147 & 148/97, Deutsche Post, cited above note 28, Advocate General 
paras. 30, 61 and 25. ‘In order to be entitled to invoke the derogation… under Arti-
cle 86(2)… DP must… furnish… a reliable estimate of the volume of mail which 
would otherwise attract the equalised domestic tariff and which… is diverted to the 
incoming cross-border mail service by the use of non-physical remail. In addition, 
the applicant must produce… an estimate of the probable loss of revenue, and prove 
its inability to generate similar revenue from the supply of other reserved services. 
The basis of comparison to be used to determine whether the application of the 
Treaty rules to an undertaking in DP's position would… compromise its ability to 
provide the universal postal service under conditions of economic equilibrium is the 
level of profits it earns… in the profitable sectors within the universal service. DP's 
submissions appear… to proceed from the opposite premiss, by assuming that it 
should be possible to provide each of the services within the reserved sector under 
conditions of financial equilibrium...’ 
103  Case T-110/95, IECC v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3706; Joined Cases T-133/95 & 
204/95, IECC v Commission [1998] ECR II-3645 para. 190 at 3702-3. 
104  Respectively: Commission Decision Case IV/36.748 REIMS II [1999] OJ L275/17, 
no party may increase terminal dues during the transitional period if the quality of 
service deteriorates Reeves T, Terminal Problems in the Postal Sector [2000] 21 
ECLR 283 at 286. 
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particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be 
affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the 
Community. [32] If it is the case that the advantage for wholesale dis-
tributors in not being assessed to the tax on direct sales of medicines ex-
ceeds the additional costs that they bear in discharging the public service 
obligations imposed on them by national law, that advantage, to the ex-
tent that it exceeds the additional costs mentioned, cannot, in any event, 
be regarded as necessary to enable them to carry out the particular tasks 
assigned to them. [33] Consequently, the answer must be that Article 
90(2) of the Treaty is to be interpreted as meaning that it does not cover 
a tax advantage enjoyed by undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
a public service such as those concerned in the main proceedings in so 
far as that advantage exceeds the additional costs of performing the pub-
lic service.’105 
C. Article 16 EC: Communitarising the SGEI? 
As observed above, the new Article 16 can be seen as both confirming and de-
nying the validity of public services. The consensus on Article 16 points to the 
upgrading of EU commitment to social goals, an upgrading reflected in 
Altmark.106 Recalling that the provision of SGEIs was traditionally reserved for 
Member States, the Article confirms an increasing concern with the operation 
of the SGEI. At least to the Commission, Article 16 reflects the idea that 
SGEIs should operate efficiently where possible. Similarly in the context of 
market liberalisation the Commission has listed a number of ‘universal ser-
vices’ which must be made available to all consumers at affordable prices.107 
Schwintowski, reciting a classical ordoliberal position on the SGEI, argues that 
the central function of Article 16 EC is to compensate for market failures: 
‘When a company provides a SGEI… the state is fulfilling its mission to 
ensure the good function(ing) of the internal market in accordance with 
the aims of Articles 4, 16, 86 EC. To be precise, the state… is actually 
implementing the concept of functioning competition, because this con-
cept intrinsically includes market imperfections such as externalities or 
                                                 
105  Case C-53/00, Ferring SA, [2001] ECR I-9067 paras. 31-33. 
106  Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH, [2003] ECR I-7747.  
107  2003 Green Paper on Services of General Interest, (COM(2003) 270 final.) para. 50, 
universal services: ‘must be made available at a specified quality to all consumers 
and users throughout the territory of a Member State, independent of geographical 
location, and… at an affordable price.’ M. Knauff, Das Grünbuch der Kommission 
über Dienstleistungen vom allgemeinem Interesse, (2003) EuZW 453 at 455. 
 asymmetrical information. Elimination of market imperfections is thus a 
component of the concept of competition per se – and in this sense com-
petition and regulation are two sides of the same coin… [C]ompetition 
theory… views market inequalities and imperfections as components of 
the competitive process… state intervention, by eliminating market im-
perfections, ensures that competition actually works.’108 
On this reading there is no trade-off between social and competition law goals, 
rather, restrictions to competition are part of the market mechanism where, 
otherwise, the market would fail. Article 16 EC thus takes its place in the 
broader picture of the EC’s development away from a Community and towards 
a Union which has a deeper idea of the citizen’s interest. As Arnull et al. ob-
serve Article 16 EC has become a constitutional principle: ‘… the provision 
captures the tension at the heart of the Union’s current… development: the 
balancing or prioritising of market-based considerations and those more con-
cerned with cohesion and social solidarity. Article 16’s strength… comes from 
its capacity as a constitutional principle that repositions or reconciles those 
forces…’109 Yet caution is called for, the ‘shared values’ to which Article 16 
EC appeals are contested: the SGEI by no means occupy common positions in 
the Member States: 
‘Article 16 offers one thread to be woven into that wider picture (of Po-
litical Union), although not without raising uncomfortable questions 
about the lack of precision in the formulae used. To point only to one of 
these, while it is not possible to dispute the prosaic truisms that such 
services occupy ‘some’ place in the shared values of the Union… it is 
not clear from the new provision whether this place is significant, or 
marginal, developing or stagnant…’110  
D. The Public Interest 
Yet for all the public relations, the reality of public/private competition has not 
always lived up to the benefits it has promised to the consumer “… Price re-
                                                 
108  H-P Schwintowski, The Common Good, Public Subsistence and the Functions of 
Public Undertakings in the European Internal Market, (2003) EBOR 353 at 372. 
Generally: R.J. van den Bergh & P.D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and 
Economics: a Comparative Perspective, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at 65-7, 
89-90.  
109  Arnull et al. European Union Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at 1143. 
110  L. Flynn, Competition Policy and Public Services in EC law after the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties, D. O’Keefe & P. Twomey (eds.) Legal Issues of the Amster-
dam Treaty (Oxford, Hart, 1999), 185 at 197-8. 
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ductions and quality improvements have certainly not occurred across the 
board. On the contrary, consumers complain about drastically increasing prices 
for electricity and gas, delayed trains, (manipulated) telephone bills and re-
duced postal services.’111 While flanking measures, aimed at protecting the 
consumer and delivering truly ‘universal’ public services, had to be passed, as 
recognised in the 2004 White Paper on the SGEI, the elaboration of a more 
general definition of the universal service, under Article 16 EC, has been frus-
trated by the rejection of the Constitution.112 The Commission has indicated 
that it will now pursue further sectoral legislation to ensure the SGEI under its 
internal market competence. As Rott observes, the danger of pursuing an inter-
nal market, rather than a more consumer protection oriented policy in the area 
of SGEI is clear: 
‘This internal market approach bears certain risks, given the general 
shift from minimum harmonisation… to the focus on maximum har-
monisation. If that trend towards maximum harmonisation also included 
services of general interest, the consequence might be that free competi-
tion, ensured through information obligations and the free choice of the 
provider, could be regarded as sufficient to guarantee the affordability of 
services of general interest, and that price controls could be prohibited… 
[E]xperience shows that this could cause harm especially to the more 
vulnerable consumers or citizens, while a too radical market-orientation 
could be in contradiction to Article 16 EC.’113  
The extent to which Article 16 EC will truly provide the ‘new soil’ for Euro-
pean citizenship remains contested. Predictably, the great majority of academ-
ics subscribe to the view of Article 16 EC as a provision entailing little more 
than a programmatic commitment to ‘solidarity’ rather than leading to any 
specific and enforceable individual rights.114    
                                                 
111  P. Rott, cited above note 2, at 324. 
112  Respectively: 2004 White Paper on SGEI, at 8. Defining the ‘universal service’ as 
guaranteeing access to everyone, whatever their economic, social or geographical 
situation, to a service of a specified quality at an affordable price. See 2003 Green 
Paper, cited above note 107. P. Rott, cited above note 2 at 325-6. Sectoral legisla-
tion: Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications, (2002) OJ L108/51. Directive 97/67 cited above note 66. Directive 
2003/54 Rules for the internal market in electricity (2003) OJ L176/37; Directive 
2003/55 Rules for the internal market in natural gas (2003) OJ L176/57. 
113  P. Rott, Consumers and services of general interest: is EC consumer law the future? 
(2007) J. Consumer Policy (Publication pending). 
114  Respectively: M. Ross, cited above note 32, at 34. P. Rott, cited above note 2, at 344. 
 V.  Conclusions 
A striking aspect of the case-law dealt with in this work is the retreat and ap-
parent re-affirmation of State capacity and the resulting changes to the demar-
cation of the bounds of power. Through the privatisation and deregulation and 
the re-regulation of the market a number of policy goals invade competition 
law. This generates the two faces of ‘public interest’ competition. The central 
paradox is that, as the state withdraws from the market it re-enters the market, 
whether as regulator or in the assignment of public service tasks. Competition 
plays an important role in these processes. The juxtaposition of the Advocate 
General’s success in Centros in arguing the pre-eminence of the freedoms, and 
his failure in Deutsche Post to convince the court of the same weighting where 
Article 86(2) EC is intersected shows the fragility of demarcation. Recently, a 
superficially more benevolent treatment of the public interest has emerged; 
reflected in the increased sensitivity to States’ prerogatives; increased sensitiv-
ity to exclusive agreements bolstered by state legislation; circumspection in the 
treatment of delegated powers; and the increasing importance attributed to pro-
cedural guarantees.  
Meanwhile, the blurring of the old boundaries between State and Market 
has generated a new functionalism: more important than the status of the un-
dertaking is the question of whether a public interest is truly involved. Where 
this occurs there is a different application of competition than in ‘private’ 
competition. Yet the suspicion is that in practice the Nation State is forced to 
rationalise policy towards evermore modest objectives. ‘Public’ EC Competi-
tion law thus lends itself to the task of centralising governance, reducing the 
scope and extent of SGEI provision.  
It is important to recognise that the impetus for harmonisation measures 
almost always came from the Courts; that the case-law underscores a subtle 
confirmation of both the market and national prerogatives; announcing, more 
recently, a ‘private turn’ of ‘public’ competition. Whether this announces the 
end of State capacity or, rather, charts a legitimate area of state influence is the 
central question addressed in this paper. While the advocates of laissez-faire 
decry European attempts to roll back state capacity as inadequate, advocates of 
state capacity see Europeanisation as instrumentalising efficiency arguments in 
the name of a neo-liberal agenda. From a strictly legal perspective, however, 
the change of emphasis in EC law has been impressive, especially given that 
there has never been a popular mandate in favour of market liberalisation. That 
the emergent policy had to take into account Member States’ prerogatives, and 
that the creation of an EC-wide conception of the general interest was needed, 
does not mean that it worked to enhance State capacity. It is also important to 
reflect on Articles 16 and 86(2) EC, the Transparency Directive and the extent 
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to which these tools represent a reassertion of state capacity. At the same time 
it has to be seen that such prerogatives as are left untouched constitute a resid-
ual or rump area of sovereignty. State capacity depends crucially on the level 
of Community inaction! 
Importantly, where the Court justifies national prerogatives it does so on 
the basis of a perceived lack of State capacity to otherwise address a given 
problem. Again, the Court stresses State prerogatives: Member States were 
held to enjoy a wide margin of discretion in organising their social security 
systems. In the light of Albany much depends on the nature of the market un-
der consideration and its proximity to genuine public authority or social secu-
rity functions, and the comparison of whether such services as are supplied via 
a special or exclusive right in one country are not typically delivered under 
competitive conditions in another. The delivery of public services by the mar-
ket works as the underlying assumption.  
The emergence of Article 86 has been the most striking recent development 
now further buttressed by Article 16 EC, which has emerged as the pivotal 
provision in elucidating the SGEI. Yet the ethos of these provisions confirms 
profound distrust of the ability of the state to regulate the market efficiently. 
Thus, in the elaboration of the economic equilibria under which public services 
may be provided, while we appear to move from the tight definition of the dis-
sociable service to a more generous idea of a protectable core of the public 
service, it is difficult to see either case as asserting state capacity. Even the 
elucidation of acceptable economic conditions for the SGEI is not unproblem-
atic. The criteria in competition are difficult to reconcile with the straitjacket 
established in free movement. Again we confirm state incapacity rather than 
capacity.  
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